Evolutionary game analysis of miners’ violation—from the perspective of planned behavior theory

In order to further suppress the miners’ violation in high-risk posts, based on the theory of planned behavior and from the perspective of limited rationality, the reward mechanism of safety managers was introduced, the game model of miners’ violation in high-risk posts and safety inspectors’ inspection was established and the behavioral benefit perception matrix was constructed, the dynamic equation of replication between the two sides of the game was analyzed. The results show that when the inspection intensity and punishment coefficient are constant, the way of reward and punishment imposed by managers on miners mainly depends on the risk aversion coefficient of miners; if the punishment intensity imposed on the first-line miners’ violation is unchanged, the increased frequency and intensity of inspection on the first-line miners can reduce the number of violation operation; if there is no change in the intensity of the safety inspectors’ inspection of miners, the managers can also suppress the miners’ violation by increasing the punishment.